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We give an example of a finite-state two-player turn-based stochastic game with safety objectives for
both players which has no stationary Nash equilibrium. This answers an open question of Secchi and
Sudderth.
1 Introduction
Stochastic games provide a general model for studying dynamic interactions between players whose
actions affect the state of the environment. The change in state is described by a probability distribution
called the law of motion. The first such games were introduced by Shapley [17]. We may view his
model as discrete-time finite two-player zero-sum games, where players receive immediate payoff in
each round of play and discount future payoffs. Shapley proved that in such games optimal stationary
(or, memoryless) strategies exists. The initial model of Shapley has since been extensively extended and
studied in many variations. With each model the main question is existence of optimal strategies or a
Nash equilibrium. Next, it is of interest how complicated such strategies must be. We shall limit our
discussion to discrete-time games having an arbitrary but finite number of states.
Everett [6] defined recursive games, where players only receive a (possibly) non-zero payoff when
play terminates by entering special absorbing states. These payoffs are also called terminal payoffs.
While players are no longer guaranteed to have optimal strategies, Everett proved that they do have ε-
optimal stationary strategies. Gillette [9] considered finite two-player zero-sum games where players
again receive immediate payoffs each round of play, but now evaluate their payoff as the average of
the immediate payoffs received (limit average payoff). Here players are no longer guaranteed to have
ε-optimal stationary strategies, but as shown by Mertens and Neyman [15] they do have ε-optimal strate-
gies. An even more general result was obtained by Martin [13] showing that for two-player zero-sum
games where payoffs are Borel measurable functions of the history of play, the players have ε-optimal
strategies. Here the extension from deterministic games (i.e. games having a deterministic law of motion)
to the general case is due to an observation of Maitra and Sudderth [11].
For non-zero sum games much less is known. For discounted payoffs, a Nash equilibrium exists in
stationary strategies as shown by Fink [7] and Takahashi [19]. The existence of ε-Nash equilibrium in
recursive games is an open problem, even for three players. In addition, Flesch, Thuijsman and Vrieze [8]
gave an example of a two-player recursive game without stationary ε-Nash equilibrium. Vieille [21, 22]
proved existence of ε-Nash equilibrium in every two-player game with limit-average payoff.
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Mertens and Neyman (cf. [14]) showed, using the celebrated determinacy result by Martin [12],
that an ε-Nash equilibrium exists in any turn-based (i.e. perfect information) game with Borel payoff
functions. Later this was observed again by Chatterjee et al. [5]. When the payoff function has finite
range, an actual Nash equilibrium exists. This is particularly the case of deterministic games where the
payoff function is the indicator function of a Borel set. We refer to the indicator function of a Borel set
as well as the set itself as a Borel winning set or Borel objective.
The most basic of these are given by the open and closed sets. Given a set of states T , the reachability
objective Reach(T ) given by T consists of the histories of play that visit a state in T . The safety objective
Safe(T ) given by T consists of the histories of play that stays within the states in T . These winning sets
are the open and closed Borel objectives typically studied, and they have applications in the verification
and synthesis of reactive systems [4].
Games where the players have reachability or safety objectives are closely related to recursive games.
First note that for a given recursive game, after normalizing all payoffs to be in the range [−1,1], every
terminal payoff vector can be written as a convex combination of payoff vectors having only entries from
the set {−1,0,1}. This means that any absorbing state can be replaced by a set of absorbing states where
all players have payoffs in the set {−1,0,1} as well by modifying the (probabilistic) law of motion
accordingly. Then, if a player only receive terminal payoffs from the set {−1,0}, this is equivalent
to a safety objective, and likewise if a player only receive terminal payoffs from the set {0,1}, this is
equivalent to a reachability objective.
Secchi and Sudderth [16] considered the class of games where each player has a safety objective,
and called these games for stay-in-a-set games. For these games they proved existence of a Nash equi-
librium in any (finite) stay-in-a-set game. The equilibrium strategies are not stationary but prescribe, as
a function of the set of the players whose safety objective has not yet been violated, a stationary strategy
profile. This means that for n players just n bits of (shared) memory are needed for implementing a Nash
equilibrium. A natural open question raised by Secchi and Sudderth was then existence of a stationary
Nash equilibrium. We give an example of a two-player game without a stationary Nash equilibrium.
Our game is furthermore turn-based. By example we also illustrate the Nash equilibria obtained from
the proof of Secchi and Sudderth. They rely crucially on the willingness of the second player to change
strategy after already having lost. In our example it is not necessary to remember whether the first player
has lost, so a single bit of shared memory is enough for implementing the equilibrium. Finally we note
that players do have a stationary ε-Nash equilibrium.
It is necessary that our example game is not deterministic. In fact, in every deterministic two-player
turn-based games, where each player has a reachability or a safety objective, a Nash equilibrium exists
in positional (i.e. pure and memoryless) strategies. This follows from the fact that two-player zero-sum
games with a reachability and safety objective are positionally determined. Thus in the non-zero sum
game it is either the case that one of the two players may guarantee a win (and relative to that we let the
other player play optimally) or it is the case that both players can ensure that the opponent loses.
2 The game
The game G we consider is played by two players each taking turns in choosing whether to continue
the game or to attempt to quit the game, with Player 1 making the first choice. A choice of the quit
action by one of the players is successful with probability 3/4, and otherwise the game continues with
the other player as before. If Player 1 makes the choice to quit both players win with probability 1/2 and
both players lose with the remaining probability 1/4. If Player 2 makes the choice to quit both players
win with probability 1/4 and both players lose with the remaining probability 1/2. Finally, Player 2 is
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incentivized to choose quit by having the continue action of Player 2 lead to a loss for Player 2 with
probability 1/4. Infinite play leads to Player 1 winning (and Player 2 losing with probability 1). This
leads to a discontinuity in the payoff function of Player 1, which is crucial for our example.
The game G is illustrated in Figure 1 and is modeled with a set of 5 states {1,2,W,L,L2}, with
Player 1 controlling state 1, Player 2 controlling state 2. State L2 exists merely to enforce a loss to
Player 2, whereas the states W and L are winning and losing states of both players, respectively. The
game G is a stay-in-a-set game with the safe sets of the two players being G1 = {1,2,W,L2} and G2 =
{1,2,W }, respectively. The diamond-shaped nodes in Figure 1 are used to indicate the probabilistic
transitions.
A stationary strategy profile σ in G can be described by a pair of probabilities (p1, p2), where pi is
the probability that Player i chooses the quit action q, when in state i (and thus (1− pi) is the probability
that Player i chooses the continue action c, when in state i).
1 2L2
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c
q
1/4
1/2
1/4
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1/4
3/4
1/4
1/4
1/2
Figure 1: The game G .
2.1 No stationary Nash equilibrium
We give here a simple analysis showing that no stationary Nash equilibrium exists in G . We can place
all plays of G in 3 groups. Group 1 are plays where Player 1 quits successfully, group 2 are plays where
Player 2 quits successfully, and group 3 are plays that never reachW or L.
Consider a stationary strategy profile σ given by (p1, p2). When p1 = p2 = 0 the play belongs to
group 3, where Player 1 wins and Player 2 loses with probability 1. When p1 > 0 or p2 > 0 the play
belongs to group 1 or group 2 with probability 1. The players both prefer a play from group 1 where
Player 1 is the player to quit successfully.
Suppose that σ is a Nash equilibrium. If p2 = 0, then the only best reply of Player 1 is to have
p1 = 0, since otherwise L is reached with positive probability. But if also p1 = 0, Player 2 loses with
probability 1, whereas p2 > 0 would lead to reachingW with positive probability. This rules out having
p2 = 0 in a Nash equilibrium.
Suppose now p2 > 0, which means that the play belongs to group 1 or group 2 with probability 1.
The probability that the play belongs to group 1 strictly increases with p1, and it follows that we must
have p1 = 1. But this is also not a Nash equilibrium, as Player 2 would then be better off having p2 = 0.
Indeed, let us consider a play from state 2 until the play either returns to state 2, reaches stateW before
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returning to state 2, or reaches state L or state L2 before returning to state 2. We denote these events a
return, a win, or a loss.
The quit action for Player 2 has probability 1/2+(1/4)(1/4) = 9/16 of a loss, probability 1/4+
(1/4)(1/2) = 6/16 of a win and (1/4)(1/4) = 1/16 of a return. The continue action has probability
1/4+(3/4)(1/4) = 7/16 of a loss, probability (3/4)(1/2) = 6/16 of a win and (3/4)(1/4) = 3/16 of
a return. Since a return is better than a loss for Player 2, this rules out p2 > 0 in a Nash equilibrium as
well.
2.2 Detailed payoff analysis
For i, j ∈ {1,2}, let ui, j = ui, j(p1, p2) be the payoff to Player i of the strategy profile (p1, p2) when
starting play in state j. The payoffs satisfy the following equations
u1,1 = ((1− p1)+ p1/4)u1,2+ p1/2= (1−3p1/4)u1,2 + p1/2
u1,2 = ((1− p2)+ p2/4)u1,1+ p2/4= (1−3p2/4)u1,1 + p2/4
u2,1 = ((1− p1)+ p1/4)u2,2+ p1/2= (1−3p1/4)u2,2 + p1/2
u2,2 = (3/4(1− p2)+ p2/4)u2,1+ p2/4= (3/4− p2/2)u2,1+ p2/4
and from these follows further
u1,1 = (1−3p1/4)(1−3p2/4)u1,1+(1−3p1/4)p2/4+ p1/2
u2,1 = (1−3p1/4)(3/4− p2/2)u2,1+(1−3p1/4)p2/4+ p1/2
When both p1 = 0 and p2 = 0 we have that u1,1 = u1,2 = 1 and u2,1 = u2,2 = 0. When at least one of
p1 > 0 or p2 > 0 holds, we can solve for u1,1, and likewise we can always solve for u2,1 to obtain
u1,1 =
(1−3p1/4)p2/4+ p1/2
1− (1−3p1/4)(1−3p2/4)
=
(8−3p2)p1+4p2
(12−9p2)p1+12p2
=
(4−3p1)p2+8p1
(12−9p1)p2+12p1
u2,1 =
(1−3p1/4)p2/4+ p1/2
1− (1−3p1/4)(3/4− p2/2)
=
(4−3p1)p2+8p1
(8−6p1)p2+9p1+4
=
(8−3p2)p1+4p2
(9−6p2)p1+8p2+4
Using ∂
∂x
ax+b
cx+d =
ad−bc
(cx+d)2
, we find that
sgn
(
∂
∂ p1
u1,1
)
= sgn(48p2) = 1 for all p2 > 0 ,
And likewise sgn
(
∂
∂ p2
u2,1
)
= sgn((4−3p1)(4−7p1)), which means that
sgn
(
∂
∂ p2
u2,1
)
=


1 if p1 <
4
7
0 if p1 =
4
7
−1 if p1 >
4
7
.
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The function u2,1 is continuous in the entire domain, whereas the function u1,1 has a single disconti-
nuity when p1 = p2 = 0. Note that u1,1(p1,0) =
2
3
for all p1 > 0, and u1,1(0, p2) =
1
3
for all p2 > 0.
The best replies of the players are as follows. If p2 = 0, the only best reply of Player 1 is to have
p1 = 0, giving u1,1 = 1. If p2 > 0, the only best reply of Player 1 is to have p1 = 1, giving u1,1 =
8+p2
12+3p2
.
If p1 < 4/7, the only best reply for Player 2 is to have p2 = 1, giving u2,1 =
4+5p1
12+3p1
. When p1 = 4/7,
Player 2 has no preferred action. Finally, if p1 > 4/7 the only best reply of Player 2 is to have p2 = 0,
giving u2,1 =
8p1
4+9p1
.
2.3 Nash equilibria
We give here two examples of Nash equilibria in the game following the general result of Secchi and
Sudderth [16]. The idea is that once Player 2 has lost by entering state L2 the incentive of Player 2 is
removed and all strategies are equally good.
Suppose first that Player 2 commits to always playing the continue action after entering state L2. The
best reply of Player 1 is then to always play the continue action as well, ending up with payoff 1. We may
thus consider the modified game G ′ that stops when entering L2 upon which Player 1 receives payoff 1.
This lead to the modified equation
u1,2 = (3/4(1− p2)+ p2/4)u1,1+1/4= (3/4− p2/2)u1,1+1/4
giving
u1,1 = (1−3p1/4)(3/4− p2/2)u1,1 +(1−3p1/4)/4+ p1/2
which solves to
u1,1 =
(1−3p1/4)/4+ p1/2
1− (1−3p1/4)(3/4− p2/2)
=
5p1+4
(9−6p2)p1+4+8p2
and we see that sgn
(
∂
∂ p1
u1,1
)
= sgn(64p2−16).
A Nash equilibria is thus that the players play the quit action with probabilities p1 = 4/7 and p2 = 1/4
respectively until state L2 is reached and after which both players play the quit action with probability
p1 = p2 = 0. The equilibrium payoffs are u1,1 = 2/3 and u2,1 = 1/2.
Suppose next that Player 2 commits to always playing the quit action after entering state L2. The best
reply of Player 1 is then to always play the quit action as well, ending up with payoff 3/5. The modified
game G ′ now has the equation
u1,2 = (3/4(1− p2)+ p2/4)u1,1+3/5(1− p2)/4+ p2/4
= (3/4− p2/2)u1,1+3/20+ p2/10
giving
u1,1 = (1−3p1/4)(3/4− p2/2)u1,1+(1−3p1/4)(3/20+ p2/10)+ p1/2
which solves to
u1,1 =
(1−3p1/4)(3/20+ p2/10)+ p1/2
1− (1−3p1/4)(3/4− p2/2)
=
(31−6p2)p1+8p2+12
5(9−6p2)p1+8+4p2
We find that sgn
(
∂
∂ p1
u1,1
)
= sgn(1120p2+80) = 1, which means that the best reply of Player 1 is always
to play the quit action, and in turn the best reply of Player 2 to that is to always play the continue action.
A Nash equilibria is thus that the players play the quit action with probabilities p1 = 1 and p2 = 0
respectively until state L2 is reached and after which Player 2 changes to playing the quit action with
probability p2 = 1 as well. The equilibrium payoffs are here u1,1 =
43
65
= 2
3
− 1
195
and u2,1 =
8
13
= 1
2
+ 3
26
.
88 A Stay-in-a-Set Game without a Stationary Equilibrium
2.4 Stationary ε-Nash equilibrium
Whereas we have shown that the game G has no stationary Nash equilibrium, it does have ε-Nash
equilibria, for any ε > 0.
When ε < 1/3 no ε-Nash equilibrium can have p2 = 0. Indeed, then the only ε-best reply of Player 1
would be the actual best reply having p1 = 0. To that, any ε-best reply of Player 2 must have p2 > 0,
when ε < 1/3.
A few examples of ε-Nash equilibria are σ1 given by p1 = 1 and p2 = ε , σ2 given by p1 =
4
7
− ε
and p2 = ε , and σ3 given by p1 =
4
7
+ ε and p2 = ε . We omit the simple task of verifying that these are
indeed ε-Nash equilibria. In σ1 the payoffs are u1,1 =
2
3
−O(ε) and u2,1 =
8
13
−O(ε), and in both σ2
and σ3 the payoffs satisfy u1,1 =
2
3
−O(ε) and u2,1 =
1
2
−O(ε). We note that Player 1 is playing the best
reply in σ1, but is (
3
7
− ε)-far from the best reply p1 = 1 in σ2 and σ3. Player 2 is playing ε-close to the
best reply p2 = 0 in σ1 and σ3, but (1− ε)-far from the best reply p2 = 1 in σ2.
3 Conclusion and Further Problems
We have given a simple example of a two-player turn-based game with safety objectives for both players
without a stationary Nash equilibrium. A remaining open question is the existence of a stationary ε-Nash
equilibrium when players have safety objectives, even in the case of two-player turn-based games.
Several related open questions concern games with reachability objectives or with combinations
of reachability and safety objectives. We first consider the setting where all players have reachability
objectives, also called reach-a-set games [5]. Flesch, Thuijsman and Vrieze [8] give an example of
a three-player recursive game with non-negative payoffs with no stationary ε-Nash equilibrium. The
game is furthermore deterministic. Simon [18] gave an example of a two-player recursive game with
non-negative payoffs with no stationary ε-Nash equilibrium. These both give examples of reach-a-set
games without stationary ε-Nash equilibria by the general method of simulating terminal payoffs with
the probabilistic law of motion. The example of Flesch, Thuijsman and Vrieze is however such that the
terminal payoff vectors satisfy that either none or precisely two players receive a strictly positive payoff.
The payoff vectors where two players receive strictly positive payoff can (after scaling) be constructed as
unique equilibrium payoffs of win-lose bimatrix games 1. This then results in a three-player deterministic
reach-a-set game with no stationary ε-Nash equilibrium.
For two-player games, it was erroneously claimed (cf. [3]) first by Chatterjee et al. [5] and later
again by Ummels and Wojtczak [20] that a simple adaptation of an example of a zero-sum game of
Everett resulted in a deterministic reach-a-set game without a Nash equilibrium. Thus it remains an
open question whether every deterministic two-player reach-a-set game has a Nash equilibrium. It is
also an open problem whether every deterministic two-player reach-a-set game has a stationary ε-Nash
equilibrium. Boros and Gurvich [1] and Kuipers et al. [10] give an example of a three-player turn-based
recursive game with non-negative payoffs that has no stationary Nash equilibrium. Do every two-player
turn-based reach-a-set game have a stationary Nash equilibrium?
Little is known when some players have a reachability objective and some players a safety objectives.
In the two-player zero-sum case an example of Everett [6] shows that optimal strategies, and hence a
Nash equilibrium, may fail to exist. On the other hand an ε-optimal stationary equilibrium always exists.
Do every two-player game where one player has a reachability objective and one player a safety objetive
1These payoff vectors are (1,1) and (3,1). It is easy to construct two 4×4 bimatrix games with only payoffs from the set
{0,1} in which the unique equlibrium payofff vectors are ( 14 ,
1
4 ) and (
3
4 ,
1
4 ), respectively, which may replace (1,1) and (3,1)
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always have a stationary ε-Nash equilibrium? In the case of turn-based games, it is an open problem
whether every three-player deterministic game has a stationary Nash equilibrium. An example given by
Boros et al. [2] appears to be close to answer this question. Namely, Boros et al. construct a three-player
deterministic recursive game without a stationary Nash equilibrium, that may be realized with payoffs
such that player two has only non-negative terminal payoffs and player one and player three have only
non-positive terminal payoffs.
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